Pakistan does, in fact, support three prominent jihadi militant groups in Jammu and Kashmir: the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jaish-e-Mohammad, even though these groups are officially banned by the Pakistani government. The United States has also routinely criticized Pakistan for supporting the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network (a U.S.-designated terrorist group), both of which frequently attack U.S. troops and coalition forces in Afghanistan.
Why does Pakistan continue to sponsor militant groups in the face of considerable U.S. pressure to stop? This question has plagued U.S.-Pakistan relations for decades.
President Trump has rebuked Pakistan, inflaming an already tense relationship when he tweeted about decades of U.S. aid to Pakistan with “nothing but lies & deceit” in return. The Trump administration subsequently reduced security and military aid to Pakistan, campaigned to add Pakistan to an intergovernmental watchlist for terrorism financing, and imposed sanctions on seven Pakistani firms involved in prohibited nuclear activities.
Unfortunately, these policies are unlikely to be effective in changing Pakistan’s behavior. Pakistan’s military establishment and intelligence agencies consider militant sponsorship an important mechanism for maintaining Pakistan’s sovereignty and national identity. Pakistan’s civilian institutions, too, have evolved to facilitate militant sponsorship by routinely legitimizing expansive executive powers, limiting judicial oversight, and violating civil liberties in the name of the national interest. Pakistan’s civilian and military institutions, therefore, are much more closely aligned on matters of state sponsorship of militant groups than most U.S. policymakers and academics think, and therefore less susceptible to outside pressure.
The United States and Pakistan have a shared interest in ending the war in Afghanistan. This objective will continue to elude Washington unless policymakers better understand the motivations behind Islamabad’s support for militant groups in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Therefore, policymakers should focus less on trying to change Pakistan’s security policies and instead find ways to leverage its existing strategic perspective in pursuit of U.S. interests.