President Trump has repeatedly signaled his intention to declare Iran in violation of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal.
The problem is that Iran is in fact complying with its obligations under the deal, which significantly rolled back Iran’s nuclear program, imposed strict limits on what remained, and subjected Iran to the most intrusive inspections regime in the world.
The alternative policy options outside the JCPOA are unappealing. In a new Cato Policy Analysis, Emma Ashford and John Glaser assess the costs of four alternatives – sanctions, challenging Iranian influence in the Middle East, supporting internal groups to foment regime change, and military action – and conclude they all carry unacceptably high risks and threaten to exacerbate the very behavior Iran hawks hope to forestall.
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4. The final policy alternative is direct military action against Iranian nuclear or military facilities. Absent a direct threat to U.S. security, any U.S. military action would likely be illegal in international courts of law. Escalation would be inevitable. Iran would likely retaliate, and all U.S. military bases in the Middle East are within range of Iran’s conventional arsenal, not to mention the possibility of terrorist attacks by Iran’s proxies.
Moreover, cooperation and negotiation with Iran, when possible, will strengthen Iran’s more moderate political factions and weaken hardliners, providing a more hopeful future for U.S.-Iranian relations.
The best approach for long-term international stability is for the U.S. to abide by the terms, help reintegrate Iran into the international economy, keep official channels of communication open, and engage, rather than isolate, the Islamic Republic.
The promise of the deal includes not only rolling back Iran’s nuclear capabilities for the foreseeable future but also paving the way toward a more constructive diplomatic relationship between Washington and Tehran. Its survival, however, depends on complex and turbulent domestic politics in both countries.
Since he started his bid for office, President Trump has been a forceful detractor of the agreement, repeatedly vowing to dismantle it. Today, his administration is conducting a review of its Iran policy, of which the nuclear deal is a critical component. He has already indicated that he wants to increase pressure on Iran, and his administration has upped the ante with the Islamic Republic, including by suggesting that America is looking to support elements pursuing a transition of power in that country.
But the nuclear deal affords the United States a number of opportunities, if the administration sustains it. The United States should clearly reaffirm its commitment to the deal; help reintegrate Iran into the international economy; keep official channels of communication open with Tehran; and engage, rather than isolate, the Islamic Republic.
Cato research fellow Emily Ekins writes: “A new Cato Institute/YouGov poll finds a solid majority—58%—of Americans supports the main components of the Iran nuclear deal, in which the United States and other countries would ease oil and economic sanctions on Iran for 10-15 years in return for Iran agreeing to stop its nuclear program over that period. Forty percent (40%) oppose such a deal.
Americans also prefer Congress to allow such a deal to go forward (53%) rather than block the agreement (46%). Support declines slightly when the deal is described as an agreement between the ‘Obama administration and Iran.’
Despite support for the deal, Americans remain skeptical it will stop Iran’s nuclear program. Fifty-two percent (52%) of Americans say the agreement is 'unlikely’ to 'stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons,’ including 32% who say it’s 'extremely unlikely.’ Conversely, 46% believe the deal is likely to achieve its primary goal.”
Iran and six world powers have finalized an agreement on the future of Iran’s nuclear program. The deal decreases the likelihood of an Iranian nuclear weapon and staves off the risk of another costly U.S. war in the Middle East. Critics of the deal argue that this will pave the way to a nuclear-armed Iran and lead to proliferation throughout the region. Neither outcome is likely.
Iran will remain a troublesome regional player with little power-projection capability under this deal. The difference now, explains Christopher Preble, Cato’s vice president for defense and foreign policy studies, is that their nuclear program is significantly rolled back and subject to stringent monitoring.
Read more on the Iranian Nuclear Deal from Cato’s Foreign Policy Scholars:
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